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ABSTRACT 
Alexander Piasecki 
Mapping Financial Investors: An Aggregated Look at Global Private Equity 
(Under the direction of Dr. Ted Zoller) 
The importance of my research can be summarized in a single phrase—the 
mapping and aggregating of global mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and private equity 
data to provide a comprehensive model for global business building. Amit Dixit (2001) 
clearly explains the need for a tool to identify and analyze global markets, “Fundamental 
differences in legal and education systems, and differing paces of evolution of the 
financial services industry, have created vastly different private equity environments 
worldwide. Even the most developed industrialized countries offer surprisingly variant 
environments for private equity firms” (p.3). 
For years, literature focused on global private equity has relied heavily on macro-
economic metrics. In the following pages, I examine research and studies done on the 
four regions I am focusing on (Asia, Europe, North America, and South America) and the 
variables that the literature has examined. I will then explore  what other variables could 
be used to evaluate private equity. Finally, I provide my conclusion based on the 
literature along with defining the role my research will have in furthering knowledge of 
global private equity markets. 
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I. Introduction 
In the past six years after the financial crisis, the global private equity market has 
blossomed into one of the most dynamic and active sectors for financial investment. 
According to the Preqin 2014 Global Private Equity Report (2014), a report that surveys 
general partners (GPs) and limited partners (LPs) on the condition of financial markets, 
2013 was the strongest year for global private equity fundraising since the financial crisis. 
Over 873 funds raised an aggregate $454bn to be invested in the coming decade across 
the globe. Despite a strong fundraising year on the global aggregate, there is regional 
variation of private equity across various geographic areas. 
My interest in global private equity began with my participation in UNC Kenan-
Flagler Business School’s GLOBE program, which allowed me to study international 
business in both Denmark and Hong Kong during my junior year. Through this program 
and study, I was able to meet various private equity investors from countries across 
Europe, Asia and North America, and was shocked about not only the variation in their 
investment theses, but also in the methods each took in doing due diligence when 
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determining where to invest. Most investors and researchers that I met with only 
focused on interest rates and macro-economic indicators.  
When I began my internship at Bank of America Merrill Lynch in the Financial 
Sponsors Group, I saw a similar focus on interest rates and macro-economic indicators as 
the private equity firms we worked for evaluated investment opportunities. Based on my 
international experience, I was motivated to see whether there was regional variation 
when introducing a new set of variables—qualitative market characteristics that I thought 
made each regional private equity market unique.   
Background 
 Mature markets, such as North America and Europe, have significantly different 
market characteristics than emerging capital markets such as South America and Asia. 
Preqin (2014) reports that these differences have led to an increase in risk-adverse 
investors, who have shied away from emerging markets such as Asia, which saw a 37% 
drop in fundraising for the region in 2013. In fact, any geographic market outside of 
North America and Europe saw their private equity fundraising drop by 50%. But what 
factors are driving these geographic decisions by investors? 
Most current research and reports on the global private equity examines the industry on 
an aggregate scale, using transaction volume and transaction size as a metric for global 
investing success. The research that does geographically segment the private equity 
market, such as the aforementioned Preqin Global Private Equity report, simply report 
statistics and fail to go in depth into the conditions that cause dynamic changes in the 
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world’s capital markets. My research will fill this gap by expanding on what impact 
market factors such as total tax rates, government regulation on foreign direct investment, 
investor protection, inflation, and legal framework have on the transaction volume and 
returns that private equity funds achieve in four key geographic regions. The four regions  
analyzed are  Asia, Europe, North America, and South America. 
Understanding the relationship between different social, legal, and regulatory 
factors and private equity returns will allow future researchers and professional investors 
to better predict geographic trends in investment activity based on qualitative factors 
engrained in each particular region’s culture and business environment.  
Hypotheses  
Before examining the relationship between private equity returns and activity and 
the variety of regional factors, I will make hypotheses based on my current knowledge 
and thoughts on how private equity returns are generated and what regions will be the 
most active in the three year period from 2012 to 2015. 
Regional Hypothesis 
With the variety of different factors affecting each regional market, I believe that 
each regional market will have very different outcomes relating to transaction 
capitalization and return. My prediction is that over the last three years, North America 
and Asia will have had the highest transaction capitalization, along with the greatest 
return, due to North America’s stable capital markets and Asia’s economic growth and 
lenient regulation towards foreign investment. I think that we will see modest increases in 
 
14 
South American returns and transaction capitalization, due to high inflation and strong 
investor protection laws. Despite a stable legal framework and investor protection, I 
believe macro-economic factors will keep Europe from generating positive returns and 
additionally cause deterioration in transaction capitalization. Many of these hypotheses 
will hinge on which variables will prove to correlate the most with transaction 
capitalization and return.  
Variable Hypothesis 
In addition to comparing the regions, I also will be comparing what variables tend 
to most significantly affect private equity transaction capitalization and returns. The 
obvious main drivers of private equity investment, which much current research and 
reports cite, are economic growth rates (GDP) and interest rates. With my research, I am 
taking a step beyond these basic two variables and expanding into five new variables—
total tax rate, government regulation on foreign direct investment, investor protection, 
inflation, and legal framework.  This set of new variables will be utilized to determine 
their effect on the transaction volume and returns that private equity funds achieve in four 
main geographic regions. 
 I believe that tax rate and inflation will have the greatest impact on my measured 
private equity metrics due to the direct relationship between taxes and internal rate of 
return and how both are attributable to macro-economic conditions, which other literature 
has examined. My hypothesis is that of the new variables I am observing, investor 
protection rankings will have the most impact on success metrics.  Following investor 
protection will be government FDI regulations and the strength of a region’s legal 
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framework in settling business disputes. Overall, my work will focus on determining 
regional variation with these new variables that have been previously under-utilized by 
the literature.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
II. Literature Review 
The importance of my research can be summarized in a single phrase—the 
mapping and aggregating of global mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and private equity 
data to provide a comprehensive model for global business building. Amit Dixit (2001) 
clearly explains the need for a tool to identify and analyze global markets, “Fundamental 
differences in legal and education systems, and differing paces of evolution of the 
financial services industry, have created vastly different private equity environments 
worldwide. Even the most developed industrialized countries offer surprisingly variant 
environments for private equity firms” (p.3). The field of global mergers & acquisitions 
(M&A) has had a record year, while private equity has slowed since the financial crisis 
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(Sheahan, 2014). Though Sheahan provides the raw data behind his global market 
analysis, he fails to address the specific cultural and economic circumstances that drive 
growth trends. I will fill the gap by providing better quantitative and qualitative context 
to each market’s situation and trend. This will structure a data-driven hypothesis, 
predicting what an optimal market for private equity business building would be. 
 In the following literature review, I examine research and studies done on the four 
regions I am focusing on (Asia, Europe, North America, and South America) to provide 
information-based conclusions on each region’s private equity environment. After 
providing qualitative context, I will explore the metrics that have been used by previous 
researchers to measure private equity success qualitatively. Finally, I provide my 
conclusion based on the literature along with defining the contribution my research will 
make in furthering knowledge on optimizing private equity markets.  
Variables 
 Most research done in the field of global private equity has focused on only a few 
regional market variables—interest rates and macro-economic indicators. Professional 
reports produced by Bain & Company (2014), Ernst & Young (2014) and Prequin (2014) 
all focus on measuring returns and transaction volume by observing regional macro-
economic changes, such as GDP growth and movement of capital markets, including 
interest rates on debt. Other literature by Dixit (2001), Chuhan (1998), Goddard (2013) 
and Megginson (2004) goes more in depth into the international strategy of private equity 
firms, even exploring the relationships between GPs and LPs, but still fall short of 
examining other market characteristics, as they still use interest rates and macro-
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economic factors as the determinants for investment allocation. Rafael La Porta (2000) 
and Mike Wright (2009) study the effects of investor protection, legal frameworks, and 
corporate governance on investors, but do not provide conclusions on how it affects 
investors’ metrics of success, nor apply their theories to a global model. I will build on 
their research, by examining how their hypotheses have fared over the past decade and 
provide a global model to examine how these qualitative characteristics shape the success 
and allocation of global investment. 
Geographic Regions 
 The geographic regions—Asia, Europe, North America, and South America will 
be covered in this literature review because the majority of current literature and private 
equity metrics exist for these four continents.   
Asia 
The private equity environment in Asia, including China and India, has facilitated 
significant deal volume and investor interest relative to other regions. Ernst & Young 
(2014) best describe the skyrocketing interest in the region as “a coming-of-age tale, one 
of demonstrated growth not only in volume and value terms, but also in the market’s 
maturity” (p.2). Ippolito (2007) provides further detail on this “coming-of-age tale”, 
noting that “lower labor costs and the increasing size of domestic markets have produced 
attractive opportunities for private equity funds, although valuations have been driven up 
to record-breaking levels because of the increasing number of investors jostling for 
business” (p.5). China and India achieved economic growth rates in 2014 of 10% and 
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8%; these rates have driven much of the increased investor awareness in the region. 
Incentives such as tax loopholes and relaxed regulations on foreign investment have 
spurred business opportunities and therefore, have increased the competition for 
investment in Asia (Ippolito, 2007). Despite evidence of success, Prequin (2013) warns 
that Asia could succumb to the same challenges of mature markets as top-line fundraising 
becomes more difficult due to changes in the legal and regulatory structures that built 
Asia into a high growth investment region.  
Europe 
 The private equity environment in Europe has been uneven in its growth and has 
seen great regional disparity. In Europe, segmentation and lack of EU integration on 
corporate governance and taxation infrastructure has caused European private equity to 
be segmented into national markets (Megginson, 2004). Alexander Groh (2008) created 
indices that ranked the attractiveness of 25 European countries for investors. The most 
important indicator for European private equity is the macroeconomic environment and 
activity of each country (Groh, 2010). Countries with strong economies and solid GDP 
growth rates (UK, Denmark, Sweden) generally ranked well, while many of the countries 
that ranked poorly (Greece, Spain, Italy) have experienced financial contraction since the 
global financial crisis. Significant government intervention, in the form of austerity 
measures, has slowed investment and deal making in many of the low ranking nations 
(Bain, 2013). Macroeconomic growth and government intervention has driven some of 
the private equity inconsistencies among European nations. 
Other factors that influenced Groh’s rankings were domestic taxation policies and 
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the type of legal system in place. Despite a volatile economy, Ireland ranked well 
because of its low corporate tax rate (12.5%) and the open nature of its economy (Tobin, 
2013). In a separate report, Groh and Liechtenstein (2011) explain that in Central and 
Eastern Europe, investors focus on the potential of institutional and cultural 
characteristics to turn the economic growth into entrepreneurial activism. Investor 
protection and corporate governance also play a role in European private equity. Lerner 
and Schoar (2005) found that relative to the French, Spanish, and German civil law 
system, investors in common law systems such as the UK use significantly less equity or 
debt and have significantly higher valuations of their investments. They also state that 
legal systems with quicker times (common law) to resolve disputes also have higher 
investment valuations. As a whole, European private equity and venture capital has seen 
a recovery since the financial crisis, but to learn more about the environments that have 
driven this change, research must focus on the economic and legal setting in each 
sovereign market (Megginson, 2004). 
North America 
 North America, driven mostly by the United States, has traditionally been the 
strongest geographic area in private equity. North America’s strength in alternative 
investments is validated by a 23% increase in deal volume since 2011 (Bain, 2013). 
Strong economic growth and active capital markets are the main drivers of this increase 
in deal making, providing a stable environment for business builders and investors to 
create and capture private equity value (Bain, 2013). Deal value has increased along with 
deal volume. Globally in 2012-2013, nine of the ten largest private equity deals were 
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conducted in North America (Bain, 2013). North America continues to be the strongest 
area for alternative investment due to strong growth, effective capital markets, and 
growing deal volume. 
Despite significant deal volume and value, other factors in North America’s 
private equity environment invite some cause for concern. The civil legal system in place 
in North America (USA, Mexico, Canada) is less adaptable and more restrictive than the 
common law systems found in parts of Europe, Asia, and South America (Adongo, 
2012). The restrictiveness of North America’s civil legal system limits the creativity that 
investors use and slows down the process of deal making, hampering deal volume (Allen, 
2002). Despite the limits of North America’s legal system, private equity has been 
successful because of government protection of investor rights. Rafael La Porta (2000) 
explains that in the USA, “when investor rights such as the voting rights of the 
shareholders and the reorganization and liquidation rights of the creditors are extensive 
and well enforced by regulators or courts, investors are willing to finance firms” (p.5). 
Government sponsored investor protection, along with strong financial and economic 
markets make North America a stable private equity environment in spite of a prohibitory 
legal system. 
South America 
A decade of stable government control, conservative fiscal policy, and growth-
focused economic policy has led to the growth of a large middle-class and private equity 
investment opportunities in South America. Ernst & Young (2013), in their Latin 
America private equity roundup, explains that strong economic growth since 2011 has 
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enabled governments to promote measures to boost GDP growth, leading to increased 
interest in emerging South American private equity markets. Private equity funds are 
increasingly focused on South America’s largest economy, Brazil, where two-thirds of 
the private equity deals in South America were closed (Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, 
2013). Major world events, such as the World Cup and Olympics, along with recent 
Brazilian energy discoveries, have spurred further investment in the region (Bain, 2013). 
The 2013 Bain report further explains why the volume of deals has increased, “A still 
difficult IPO market is prompting companies in need of growth capital to tap alternative 
sources, and the presence of a big population of family-owned businesses in search of 
liquidity and succession planning solutions has also led to many deals” (p.18). Increasing 
government stability in South America is also drawing further investment interest. There 
has been increased private equity interest in South America due to recent GDP growth, 
the emergence of Brazil, and increased government stability. 
Despite increased interest in the alternative investment market in South America, 
there are still regional issues within this fast expanding market. Even with the recent 
success, the region is expected to have flat GDP growth in 2014-2015 at 2.7% (Ernst & 
Young, 2013). Much of this stagnating growth is due to South America’s reliance on 
Asian demand for South American exports (Bain, 2013). Despite government stability, a 
lack of investor protection laws and regulations are a threat to future private equity 
growth (Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, 2013). South America has leveraged significant 
macroeconomic growth, stable government, and Brazilian momentum to attract a steady 
flow of capital from both domestic and international investors. In the future, investors 
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will continue to monitor South America’s close economic relationship with Asia, as 
well as changes in investor protection laws and regulations in their planning for 
additional investment. 
Metrics 
 In addition to the qualitative literature that has been done, different qualitative 
metrics are also being used to measure private equity markets. The three metrics that 
have been utilized by researchers and that I will be using in my research are calculation 
of return, deal volume, and leverage ratio.  
Calculating Return 
 Researchers and investment professionals use internal rate of return (IRR) to 
evaluate the success of different investments made in certain industries and markets. By 
using sample of IRRs from investments in particular regions, researchers have been able 
to evaluate the success of regional alternative investment markets (Goddard, 2013). The 
calculation, as shown below in Figure 1.1 by the Association of Chartered Certified 
Accountants (ACCA), takes the net present value of an investment at a certain time and 
discount rate, divided by the difference between net present values, finally multiplied by 
the difference in discount rates (2014). This percentage is then added to the current 
discount rate to get to the internal rate of return. 
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IRR is preferred to the simpler return on investment (ROI) calculation because IRR 
integrates discount rates, providing a more precise measure of return (ACCA, 2014). 
Disadvantages of using IRR as a calculation of a successful market include small self 
selected sample sizes and the IRR hyperbole, where private equity firms may embellish 
certain financial results and metrics (“USC libraries: Limitations of the study,” 2012). 
Despite these shortcomings, IRR continues to be the most readily available and accurate 
method to evaluate the financial success of particular regional markets. 
Transaction Capitalization 
 Transaction capitalization is the most common method of measuring overall 
private equity activity in a particular region. In many global private equity reports, 
including Bain (2013), Ernst & Young (2013), Goddard (2013), and Sheahan (2014), deal 
volume is used to evaluate the regional viability for investment. When explaining 
transaction capitalization, these reports segment deal volume into two specific metrics: 
a) Average transaction value in each region ($MM) 
b) Actual number of transactions completed 
Figure 2.1: Calculation of Internal Rate of Return (IRR) 
Source: ACCA, 2014 
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By multiplying these two metrics together, researchers obtain an estimate for 
the private equity investment activity for any particular year. Though deal volume 
provides a good proxy for regional investment activity, it fails to account for the 
cyclicality of private equity funds (Lerner, 2011). Funds are not always investing, and 
often times go through multiple years of fundraising (Lerner, 2011). Therefore, 
researchers must pair deal volume with a performance-based metric such as IRR to get a 
complete qualitative view of a region.  
Importance of my research 
In addition to providing context for existing research to find an optimal market, 
the importance of my research will be in its diving deeper into what market 
characteristics investors observe, both consciously and subconsciously, before investing 
in a particular geographic region. While large consultancy firms complete research 
detailing specific regions, these firms leave a gap in the research by failing to compare 
the regions on a global scale and simply use growth rates and interest rates as their main 
variables. Martin Goddard (2013) lays out his research on private equity for a variety of 
developing and developed countries, detailing each country’s main trend for 2013-14. I 
will expand upon this existing research by exploring the connections, comparisons, and 
contrasts between the regional markets and compiling regional differences into a series of 
maps. This will provide a valuable resource to audiences looking to understand the global 
private equity network. Ultimately the task is to answer the following question: By 
observing and mapping the private equity markets globally, can I find a specific 
economic and cultural environment that is optimal for business building? Researching 
 
25 
this question will lead to further study on the application of an optimal private equity 
environment in areas of the world that currently have very little alternative investment, 
such as Africa and the Middle East. 
 
 
 
 
III. Research Methodology 
My study will gather data in order to understand what characteristics create an 
optimal private equity and business building environment. I will gather data regarding the 
unique investing characteristics of different geographic areas where private equity is 
currently invested. This section describes the (a) research design, (b) sources of data and 
information, (c) data analysis, and (d) limitations of the study. 
 
Research Design 
 I gathered data for this study using a mixed approach of qualitative and 
quantitative research methods (Creswell, 2003). My research suggests that a mixed 
method approach has significant advantages over a single-method approach: 
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a) Salehi and Golafshani (2010) find that the researcher can minimize 
the limitations and capitalize on the strengths of each approach by 
combining both quantitative and qualitative methods. 
b) Tashakkori and Teddlier (2003) argue that researchers are enabled to 
use a more comprehensive approach when they use mixed method 
research. 
This study aims to collect valuable qualitative and quantitative data. I will collect 
data from two sources: financial data and geographic data. I will generate qualitative data 
by leveraging academic research and professional industry reports.  
Sources of Data and Information 
 I will find data for my research from three sources: World Economic Forum 
survey results, database statistics, and academic/professional reports. I will aggregate 
these three sources in order to map trends in private equity in different geographic areas 
and evaluate what factors make each market environment successful.  
World Economic Forum Survey Results 
 I will be using survey data and statistics from the World Economic Forum’s 
Global Competitiveness Report from the years 2012-2015. The variables I will be 
examining from these rankings will be: 
a) Total applied tax rates 
b) Inflation rates 
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c) Government regulations on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
d) Investor Protection  
e) Efficiency of legal framework in settling disputes 
The WEF report ranks over 144 countries in six continents by these variables. For each 
region, I took the five most active countries in private equity and averaged their yearly 
rankings, tax rates and inflation rates in order to have a regional average for which to 
compare to the regional transaction capitalization and returns.  
Databases 
  I plan to gather financial data via databases to provide my research with a 
quantitative structure. I will use CapitalIQ, Dealbreaker, and Burgis Private IQ as my 
main databases. Academic institutions use these three databases for research purposes, 
while financial professionals use them to evaluate the potential viability and valuation of 
future investment opportunities. I will collect three specific sets of data regarding global 
private equity deals using CapitalIQ, Dealbreaker, and Burgis Private IQ, including: 
a) Average transaction capitalization (volume) in each region and how 
volume has changed over the last three years 
b) The internal rate of return (IRR) achieved by reporting private equity 
firms in each region 
I will compare the maturity and historic development of each region’s private 
equity market. I will use yearly transaction capitalization and internal rate of return as 
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quantitative benchmarks to test the affects of the variables shown in the World 
Economic Forum report. Return on investment will be used as a measure of success, with 
regions showing 10+% returns constituting a high level of success. 
Academic Research and Professional Analysis 
  I plan on using academic research and professional private equity analysis to 
provide context for my WEF survey data and my database financial data. I will focus on 
finding reports published within the last 10 years to ensure I have research from both 
before and after the financial crisis. I will choose research articles with a focus on the 
unique characteristics of each region’s private equity market. The characteristics found 
from these reports will help determine which specific characteristics compose an optimal 
private equity-investing environment. 
Analysis 
 The procedure for my data analysis has two key steps. First, I will create a series 
of graphs to compare and contrast the key variables of the private equity environments of 
four geographic regions. Each graph will examine how a particular variable (i.e. 
inflation) affects return on investment in the area. In the second step, I will examine the 
most successful areas on the graphs to identify market features that have contributed to 
positive returns. 
Graphing  
Graphing the correlations of the private equity markets will create a valuable tool 
for answering investors’ questions about global markets. The series of maps produced 
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from my data will create visualization of the how the following variables affect return 
on investment: 
a) Government regulation: At what level does government regulate and 
restrict private investment? 
b) Legal framework: At what level do regional laws and intellectual 
property rights restrict investing success? 
c) Transaction capitalization: How does transaction size and deal volume 
vary across the globe? What drives the global variation? 
d) Tax & inflation rates: How does amount to regional tax rates and 
inflation rates affect global investment returns and transaction 
capitalization? 
The various graphs produced will allow me to identify which market features 
allow geographic regions to generate the greatest return on investment.  
Limitations 
 The research produced in this study will rely on a number of imperfect sources. 
For example, WEF survey results are self-reported and therefore subject to the following 
biases: 
a) Uninformed response: respondents may provide inaccurate 
information if challenged in topics where they have insufficient 
knowledge (Sounders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2009) 
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b) Hyperbole: firms may embellish certain results, metrics, and 
experiences (“USC libraries: Limitations of the study,” 2012) 
c) False Attribution: respondents may accredit positive results and 
successes to the respondent’s own work but ascribe negative results 
and failures to external factors (“USC libraries: Limitations of the 
study,” 2012) 
In addition to the limitations of self-reported data, the global nature of the study 
will create further limitations on the completeness of research. Some geographic regions 
of the study will have more accessible academic and professional research coverage than 
others. The language barrier and global differences in the standard of financial reporting 
will also cause imperfect data collection. My mixed method approach and variety of 
sources described above will mitigate the various disadvantages of each source and 
approach (Creswell, 2003). Finally, it is important to note that even with the variety of 
observations I make in the following sections, I cannot document statistical relationships, 
and the results of my study could be interpreted in multiple ways due to the lack of more 
data points for each region.  
 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IV. Findings: Regional Case Studies 
I have conducted regional case studies of four private equity regions, including 
Asia, Europe, North America, and South America. Using data from the World Economic 
Forum (WEF) and Burgiss Private IQ, I will examine how regional market characteristics 
such as total tax rates, inflation government regulation on foreign direct investment, 
investor protection, and legal framework have on the transaction volume and returns that 
private equity funds achieve in four main geographic regions. Since the regions are large, 
I have selected the countries most active in each regional private equity market to reach 
our regional average rankings and statistics.  
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Asia 
Bain & Company (2014), in their Asia-Pacific Private Equity Report, label the 
Asian market as “working through a multi-year transition” leaving significant unspent 
capital and few lucrative opportunities for exiting existing investments. Currency and 
governance issues in Asia have hampered the returns and investor sentiment from record 
capital in-flow into the region (Bain & Company, 2014). I analyzed the tax rates, 
inflation rates, and qualitative factor ranking for the five largest private equity markets 
(based on Burgiss Private IQ data) on the continent—China, South Korea, Japan, Hong 
Kong SAR, and Singapore, in order to find what factors may be driving these results.  
Total Tax Rate 
Total tax rate as defined by Klaus Schwab (2014) of the World Economic Forum 
is “a combination of profit tax (% of profits), labor tax and contribution (% of profits), 
and other taxes (% of profits).” Figure 4.1 illustrates the relationship between the average 
Asia regional tax rates and regional IRR and transaction capitalization over the three-year 
period from 2012-2015. As you can see, it appears that capital in-flows are very reactive 
to variations in the tax rate, with transaction capitalization peaking at $27,212M in 2013 
when the average total tax rate fell to 35.8%. Decreases in total tax rate in Korea and 
Hong Kong—due to initiatives to attract both domestic and foreign investment helped 
offset an increased tax rate in Japan.  
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IRR also seems to rise with the decrease in the total tax rate in 2013 but then 
leveled off growth when taxes returned to 38.3% in 2014. Bain & Company (2014) warns 
that further tax hikes in Japan could cause investors to reallocate investments to other 
Asian countries such as Korea and even the South Pacific such as Indonesia.  
Inflation Rate 
 Klaus Schwab (2014) compiled the inflation rates of 144 countries by measuring 
the annual percent change in the consumer price index. In line with my hypothesis that 
the inflation rate variable would be the one of the most impactful of the control metrics, 
the decreasing average Asian inflation rate, from 3.4% in 2012 to 2.2% in 2014, mirrored 
an increase in IRR—8.3% to 11.8% in the same period. At the same time, transaction 
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capitalization seemed to have no particular correlation to the decrease in inflation, as 
the transaction capitalization seems to move independently from inflation rates. 
 
Government Regulation on FDI 
 Since many of the countries in Asia are still developing at a high growth rate, 
additional foreign capital is desirable. The World Economic Forum’s rankings on the 
strictness of regulation on foreign direct capital (FDI) reflect these economic trends, as 
two of the selected countries (Hong Kong, Singapore) ranked in the second and third 
place every year from 2012 to 2015, with low ranks indicating encouraging FDI 
regulation, and higher ranks indicating adversarial government regulation for foreign 
investors such as private equity investors. As displayed in the table below, we see an odd 
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trend of increased adversarial government regulation affecting foreign investment, 
though it does not seem to negatively affect returns, as IRR increases from 8.31% in 2012 
to 11.80% in 2014.  
 
2012 2013 2014 
Regulations Effect on FDI (Average Rank) 35 37 42 
Internal Rate of Return (IRR) 8.31% 10.78% 11.80% 
Transaction Capitalization ($M) 17,056 27,212 19,440 
 Countries such as the Republic of Korea and Japan offset the encouraging FDI 
regulation of Hong Kong, Singapore and partially China (ranked in the mid-20s) due to 
significant protectionist regulation. Despite these regulations, according to Bain & 
Company survey data, many GPs continue to express interest in Korea and Japan due to 
impending laws set to break up large conglomerates that constrict the ownership structure 
of much of each respective country’s business environment (2014). New anti-trust laws 
would help continue Korea’s strong recent deal flow, and make it a huge target for new 
investment. 
 
Efficiency of legal framework in settling disputes 
The efficiency of legal frameworks revealed similar correlations and rankings to the FDI 
regulation. With low ranks indicating extremely efficient legal framework in settling 
disputes between private businesses and higher ranks indicating inefficient legal 
framework, we saw the same two countries (Hong Kong, Singapore) lead the way with  
Table 4.1: Asia Government regulation impact on FDI vs. IRR and Transaction Capitalization 
 
36 
low ranks, even having Singapore rank the most efficient legal framework (rank #1) of 
all the WEF surveyed countries.   
 Countries such as Korea and China raised the regional average ranking of Asia, 
while Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore brought the average down to a respectable low 
30s ranking from 2012 to 2014. The ranking of efficiency of legal framework did not 
seem to greatly affect IRR or transaction capitalization of private equity firms, nor did 
secondary research and survey data bring up legal framework as a factor for LPs. 
monitor.  
 
Investor Protection 
For private equity investors, especially when investing in global markets, strong 
investor protection laws are essential in making investment decisions. For Asia, investor 
protection displayed a similar trend to governmental FDI regulation and legal framework 
efficiency. With low rankings indicating a high level of investor protection and higher 
rankings indicating less legal protections for investors, Hong Kong and Singapore once 
Year          2012 2013 2014 
Efficiency of legal framework in settling disputes  33 32 31 
Internal Rate of Return (IRR) 8.31% 10.78% 11.80% 
Transaction Capitalization ($M) 17,056 27,212 19,440 
Table 4.2: Asia efficiency of legal framework in settling disputes vs. IRR and Transaction 
Capitalization 
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again were leaders of stability, ranking globally third and second respectively in 
investor protection.  
Year 2012 2013 2014 
Investor Protection 33 42 44 
Internal Rate of Return (IRR) 8.31% 10.78% 11.80% 
Transaction Capitalization ($M) 17,056 27,212 19,440 
Interestingly, Asia’s largest market, China, ranked very poorly at 83 in 2014, 
explaining why many private equity investors are choosing to reallocate from the Greater 
China area into other areas, such as Korea and Southeast Asia. Japan’s rankings fall from 
17 in 2012 to 85 in 2014 also skewed the rising regional ranking average. Japan’s 
decrease in investor protection has been due to increasing currency struggles and 
nationalist regulatory policies. Lynn Hew explains that investor protection in Asia, 
specifically Japan, could struggle due to a wavering commitment to disclosure of 
conflicts of interest by board members, fewer remedies available in case of prejudicial 
related-party transactions and a lack of safeguards for shareholders of privately held 
companies (2003). As whole, rising investor protection ranking seem to couple with a 
slowing growth in IRR, but does not seem to affect transaction capitalization. 
Summary 
 The table below shows how the findings either prove or disprove my hypothesis 
and show how effective they are in affecting private equity returns and transaction 
volume. In Asia, the control hypotheses of tax rate and inflation were significant factors, 
as was the newly introduced variable of efficiency of legal frameworks. 
Table 4.3: Asia investor protection vs. IRR and Transaction Capitalization 
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Europe 
 After four rough years enduring the lingering effects from the Euro Zone crisis, 
European private equity has offered signs of positivity. At the peak of the continents 
issues in 2009, banks withdrew from the market, and economic uncertainty dented 
investor confidence resulting in only 672 buyouts with a transaction capitalization worth 
€30.5 billion being closed in Europe (Bagshaw, 2014). Key debt markets in Europe, 
including the UK, have begun to return to low interest rates. The emergence of alternative 
sources of acquisition finance, such as asset-based lending has also helped lure investors 
back into the European continent. Though returns will likely continue to struggle and lag 
behind other geographic regions, there is room for optimism as Europe rises out of 
recession. My study analyzed the five major sovereign private equity markets in Europe-
the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, and Norway. 
Total Tax Rate 
 When I first started my study, I hypothesized that Europe would generally have 
higher total tax rates in comparison to other geographic regions, but I was curious to see 
  
Asia 
Control  Total Tax Rate + 
Hypothesis Inflation + 
Variable 
Hypothesis 
Regulations Effect on FDI - 
Efficiency of legal framework in settling disputes + 
 Investor Protection - 
Table 4.4: Variable hypotheses effect on return and transaction volume 
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whether these high tax rates would affect returns or transaction volume in Europe. As 
seen in Figure 4.3, the average total tax rate of the European countries included in the 
study stayed constant while returns dropped from 8.54% in 2012 to 2.74% in 2015, 
indicating no correlation. At the same time, transaction capitalization grew, indicating 
that the beginning of new investment of dry powder capital. 
 
Countries such as Italy and France have total tax rates of over 60%, which drove 
the regional average tax rate up, despite these two countries accounting for less than 25% 
of transaction capitalization in Europe. The United Kingdom, Europe’s most private 
equity-engaged country, had the lowest tax rate (34.0%), and the region set to see the 
most growth in transaction capitalization. Since we can conclude that total tax rate is not 
the main factor affecting European private equity, it is important to evaluate what other 
market characteristics investors are monitoring, other than the obvious factors such as 
GDP growth and interest rates. 
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Inflation Rate 
 Inflation rate seems to affect returns in my case study of Europe. Interestingly 
enough, it IRR decreases as inflation decreases, the opposite correlation from what was 
observed in Asia. As inflation decreases from 3.1% in 2012 to 1.6% in 2014, IRR 
decreases accordingly, changing from 8.54% in 2012 to 2.74% in 2014. For  
 
transaction capitalization, we see similar results as observed in Asia, as the decrease in 
inflation (due to an overall stabilization of the European economy) is correlated with an 
increase in transaction volume.  
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Government Regulation on FDI 
 As a more developed continent than emerging markets such as Asia and South 
America, I hypothesized that government regulation on FDI would be more significant in 
Europe than in those maturing economies. Based on my study shown in table 4.5, this 
hypothesis was validated as the countries selected for my survey ranked in the 50-60 
range, while Asia was more lenient on FDI, with an average rank in the 30’s. This is 
mostly due to the stricter FDI regulation in Italy and France, both ranked in the upper half 
of countries surveyed in the WEF report. The UK once again displayed why it is the hot 
bed of European private equity, as its regulations ranked as the eighth most favorable for 
FDI. The decreasing average rank (62 in 2012 to 51 in 2014) also displays correlation 
with the corresponding increase in transaction capitalization from 2012-2014. 
 
 
Efficiency of legal framework in settling disputes 
 My hypothesis was that more developed markets would have a great efficiency of 
legal framework. For several European countries, including the UK, Germany and France 
this is true, and their legal frameworks ranked among the most efficient in the world. But 
the extremely inefficient and ineffectiveness of the Italian legal framework (ranked 143 
out of 166 in 2014) significantly lowered Europe’s average regional ranking to 50 in 
 
2012 2013 2014 
Regulations Effect on FDI 62 69 51 
Internal Rate of Return (IRR) 8.54% 6.38% 2.74% 
Transaction Capitalization ($M) 37,157 61,219 53,250 
Table 4.5: Europe Government regulation impact on FDI vs. IRR and Transaction Capitalization 
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2014. Despite this outlier, I still believe that the low rankings of the other countries 
validate efficient legal frameworks as a factor on why investors are attracted to the 
region. Table 4.6 displays the progression of these legal framework efficiency rankings 
vs. returns and transaction volume.  
 
2012 2013 2014 
Efficiency of legal framework in 
settling disputes  52 54 50 
Internal Rate of Return (IRR) 8.54% 6.38% 2.74% 
Transaction Capitalization ($M) 37,157 61,219 53,250 
  
Ian Bagshaw of White & Case explains that investment opportunities in both the 
US and Europe are in part sought after because of the legal structures that exist in order 
to resolve disputes regarding capital structure (2014). Additionally, Bagshaw adds that 
the integration of US and European capital markets (US debt being used in European 
deals) has made the legal framework more complex, but the main countries (UK, 
Germany, France) have adjusted accordingly. 
Investor Protection 
 I hypothesized that investor protections in Europe would be strong due to the 
developed nature of its capital markets and its complex legal framework. I was surprised 
to find that only the UK ranked well with strong investor protection (#10) among the 
Table 4.6: Europe efficiency of legal framework in settling disputes vs. IRR and Transaction 
Capitalization 
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European countries included in the study. Especially surprising were the low marks 
that Germany and France garnered, both ranking 83 and 68 respectively. 
 
Norway was another bright spot for Europe, ranking at 22 for its investor 
protection. Much of the recent investment into Scandinavia has been because of Table 4.7 
displays the progression of the regional average investor progression rankings, which are 
higher (weaker investor protection) than Asia. Overall, Europe surprised me with lower 
than average investor protection rankings, potentially a reason that Europe has taken so 
long to climb out of the financial crisis. 
Summary 
 In Europe, we saw different results, as we saw the macro-economic variables of 
total tax and inflation not to be relevant, and only observed the efficiency of legal 
framework being significant in association with private equity success. Though a 
combination of different macro-economic factors were most likely to blame (Euro-crisis) 
it is interesting to see how almost none of the observed variables could explain Europe’s 
situation.  
 
 
2012 2013 2014 
Investor Protection 52 51 52 
Internal Rate of Return (IRR) 8.54% 6.38% 2.74% 
Transaction Capitalization ($M) 37,157 61,219 53,250 
   
      Table 4.7: Europe investor protection vs. IRR and Transaction 
Capitalization 
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North America 
North America continues to be the global leader in private equity returns and 
transaction volume. Much of this can be attributed to the majority of mega fund private 
equity firms such as Blackstone and KKR being based in the USA. The cooling of 
emerging alternative investment markets also have led to investors seeking more mature 
markets like the United States.  But what other factors continue to keep North America as 
the preferred region for investors? I studied the United States, Mexico, and Canada to see 
how unique market characteristics correlate with returns and transaction capitalization 
from 2012 to 2014.  
Total Tax Rate 
 When I hypothesized about North America’s tax rate, I thought it would be 
among the higher tax rates in the world. I also hypothesized that any decrease in tax rate 
would result in higher returns and greater transaction volume. As seen in Figure 4.5, my 
second hypothesis was validated by the data collected from WEF and Burgis Private IQ. 
As the total regional average tax rate dropped from 43% in 2012 down to 41% in 2014,  
 
Control  Total Tax Rate + - 
Hypothesis Inflation + - 
Variable 
Hypothesis  
Regulations Effect on FDI - - 
Efficiency of legal framework in settling 
disputes + + 
 
Investor Protection - - 
Table 4.8: Variable hypotheses effect on return and transaction volume 
Asia Europe 
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the regional internal rate of return rose from 14.2% in 2012 to 15.8% in 2014. Though the 
changes may not be as extreme as other regions, it is important to realize that the scale of 
the North American market is much larger (over twice the size of Europe and six times 
the size of Asia) and therefore harder to make significant changes due to the tremendous 
amount of capital already committed to the region. I was very surprised to see that the 
total average regional tax rate in the USA ended up being significantly lower than in 
either Europe or South America, and even was comparable to Asian tax rates. 
Inflation Rate 
The impact of the inflation rate continued to prove my control hypothesis in my 
analysis of North America. The inflation rate affected returns and transaction volume in 
North America similarly to how inflation affected the same metrics in Asia-decreasing 
inflation resulted in increases in IRR and transaction capitalization. This correlation can 
be seen in Figure 4.6, 
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with inflation and IRR plotted on the first y-axis, and transaction volume plotted on the 
second y-axis.  
 Though inflation seems to be a key factor driving the decision making of 
investors in the USA, it is important to examine other factors that may make it by far the 
largest private equity market.  
Government Regulation on FDI 
Like its mature market counterpart Europe, North America had middling ranks on 
their encouragement of foreign direct investment. North America is driven by the large 
capital markets available in North America to use debt for purchases and equity markets 
for exits, lessening the need for FDI to spur the economy. Mexico had the most 
encouraging government regulation ranking while Canada had the strictest regulation.  
 
2012 2013 2014 
Regulations Effect on FDI 53 53 52 
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Table 4.9: North America Government regulation impact on FDI vs. IRR and Transaction 
Capitalization 
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Internal Rate of Return (IRR) 14.25% 15.84% 15.82% 
Transaction Capitalization ($M) 159,290 189,054 167,314 
    
Though government regulation on FDI is certainly a factor that investors monitor, it is 
not quite the driving market factor that inflation is.  
Efficiency of legal framework in settling disputes 
 North America also had middling ranks in the regions efficiency of legal 
framework in settling disputes. Canada had the greatest efficiency, ranking just outside 
the top ten, while Mexico and their broken judiciary system ranked 99th.  
 
2012 2013 2014 
Efficiency of legal framework in settling disputes  48 45 44 
Internal Rate of Return (IRR) 14.25% 15.84% 15.82% 
Transaction Capitalization ($M) 159,290 189,054 167,314 
These results once again surprised me, as I had hypothesized that efficiency of legal 
systems would be a major driver of returns and transaction volume while it seems that the 
ranking does not impact returns nor volume in a significant manner.  
Investor Protection 
 In North America, investor protection appears to have been the key reason that the 
region’s transaction capitalization ($167,314M in 2014) is more than three times greater 
than the next largest region (Europe with $53,250M in 2014). Besides the outlier of 
Mexico, which ranked 57th in investor protection laws in 2014 (great improvement from  
Table 4.10: North America efficiency of legal framework in settling disputes vs. IRR and Transaction 
Capitalization 
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78th in 2012), the United States and Canada make up the strongest combination of 
market size and investor protection laws, as they ranked 5th and 6th respectively.  
 
 
 These high rankings for the United States and Canada are due to the required 
accountability of board members to shareholders in North America, and the increasing 
amount of compliance, supervision, and due diligence required from companies (Hew 
2003). 
Summary 
 In North America, we observed similar conclusions as we saw in Asia, with the 
addition of investor protection laws becoming a meaningful factor.  
 
2012 2013 2014 
Investor Protection 30 24 22 
Internal Rate of Return (IRR) 14.25% 15.84% 15.82% 
Transaction Capitalization ($M) 159,290 189,054 167,314 
  
Asia Europe  North America 
Control  Total Tax Rate + - + 
Hypothesis Inflation + - + 
Variable 
Hypothesis 
Regulations Effect on FDI - - - 
Efficiency of legal framework in 
settling disputes + + + 
 
Investor Protection - - + 
Table 4.11: North America investor protection vs. IRR and Transaction Capitalization 
Table 4.12: Variable hypotheses effect on return and transaction volume 
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South America 
 Underlying secular trends such as a growing middle class and favorable 
demographics in South America have made the region increasingly significant in global 
private equity. But still after recent years of growth in transaction volume and economic 
growth, South America has been hampered since 2012 by weakening economic 
conditions, both domestically and in its largest trade partner, China (Bunder 2013). 
Bunder mentions that firms must have patience, resilience, robust networks, access to 
local resources and ability to add value in active partnership with entrepreneurs to 
succeed in the region. I used the four main South American countries invested in private 
equity for my study - Peru, Brazil, Argentina and Chile.  
Total Tax Rate 
 I was surprised by the total tax rate results from South America, as I had 
hypothesized that South America would have lower tax rates than some developed 
economies, due to the emerging market nature of the geographic region.  
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Tax rates for the region rose from 60.3% in 2013 to 63.2% in 2014, making them the 
highest regional tax rates for the four geographic regions included in my study. 
Corresponding with the tax rate increase, we see a fall in IRR and transaction 
capitalization. Countries such as Chile had lower tax rates (27.7% in 2014) but were 
offset by the extremely high tax rates of Argentina (107.8% in 2014), which were the 
second highest of the 144 countries surveyed by the WEF. Tax rate once again seems to 
drive both returns and transaction capitalization. 
Inflation Rate 
The inflation rate in South America is particularly relevant because much of 
demand for many of the region’s biggest companies and industries is domestic—meaning 
that inflation directly affects the profitability of South America’s main industries. In 
accordance with the research from Jeff Bunder in his Ernst & Young report (2014), the 
past three years have been particularly difficult due to decreasing domestic demand, 
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Figure 4.8: South America Average Inflation Rate vs. IRR and Transaction Capitalization ($M) 
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mostly due to rising inflation, which has slowed the growth of a previously emerging 
middle class.  
 
 
 Average regional inflation rose from 5.8% in 2012 to 6.9% in 2014 in South 
America, mostly due to increases in South America’s two largest economies—Argentina 
and Brazil. We see the results of increased inflation, as IRR dips into negative returns, 
while transaction capitalization dropped from $5,354M in 2012 to $3,231M in 2014. 
According to my study, inflation continues to have an inverse relationship with regional 
returns and transaction volume.  
Government Regulation on FDI 
  There was quite a bit of disparity in the rankings of the four countries’ 
regulations on FDI. Countries still using many of the neo-liberal policies enacted in the 
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20th century, such as Peru and Chile, had very encouraging government regulation on 
FDI, ranking in the top quarter of countries surveyed. On the other side, other South 
American countries such as Argentina have implemented very restrictive regulation on 
foreign investors, which coupled with high tax rate and increasing inflation, has driven 
investors from the country.  
 
2012 2013 2014 
Regulations Effect on FDI 63 70 75 
Internal Rate of Return (IRR) -0.14% -1.14% -1.41% 
Transaction Capitalization ($M) 5,354 4,375 3,231 
My study observes that the average regional regulation rank increases from 2012 
to 2014, correlating with the decrease in IRR and transaction capitalization. Based on the 
results from the other emerging market region (Asia), favorable FDI regulations are key 
to luring private equity investors. Based on my results, Asia has done better job than 
South America of opening up to FDI, and has been rewarded with increased transaction 
volumes and returns.  
Efficiency of legal framework in settling disputes 
Similarly to the regions falling WEF ranking on government encouragement of 
FDI, South America also is enduring plummeting efficiency of legal frameworks in the 
four countries chosen for my study. Though Chile ranked the highest in legal framework 
efficiency, all four countries saw their rankings fall from 2012 to 2014.  
Table 4.13: South America Government regulation impact on FDI vs. IRR and Transaction 
Capitalization 
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2012 2013 2014 
Efficiency of legal framework in settling 
disputes  63 93 102 
Internal Rate of Return (IRR) -0.14% -1.14% -1.41% 
Transaction Capitalization ($M) 5,354 4,375 3,231 
Table 4.14 displays this decrease in legal efficiency and the correlated decrease in IRR in 
transaction capitalization. Though this decrease in metrics may be the result of a 
combination of factors, including the rising tax rate, increasing inflation, less favorable 
legislation and a decrease in legal framework efficiency, this case study of South 
American private equity from 2012 to 2014 displays an example of poor private equity 
conditions.  
Investor Protection 
Investor protection was one ranking on which South America had comparable 
conditions to other geographic regions. Relying on low rankings from Chile and Peru, 
ranked 34th and 16th respectively, South America’s investor protection ranking stayed 
stable around 50th out of the 144 countries surveyed by the World Economic Forum. 
Table 4.15 shows this stability, something rare for the South American continent. 
Investor protection continues to be a non-factor, disproving my original hypothesis that it 
would be the most impactful qualitative variable. 
 
Table 4.14: South America efficiency of legal framework in settling disputes vs. IRR and Transaction 
Capitalization 
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Summary 
 The South America findings support the control hypotheses of total tax rate and 
inflation as well as efficiency of legal framework in settling disputes. Additionally, 
government regulation on foreign direct investment became a relevant factor, where it 
had not been in the previous three regions.  
 
 
 
 
 
2012 2013 2014 
Investor Protection 51 53 50 
Internal Rate of Return (IRR) -0.14% -1.14% -1.41% 
Transaction Capitalization ($M) 5,354 4,375 3,231 
  
Asia Europe  
North 
America 
South 
America 
Control  Total Tax Rate + - + + 
Hypothesis Inflation + - + + 
Variable 
Hypothesis  
Regulations Effect on 
FDI - - - + 
Efficiency of legal 
framework in settling 
disputes + + + + 
 Investor Protection - - + - 
Table 4.16: Variable hypotheses effect on return and transaction volume 
Table 4.15: South America investor protection vs. IRR and Transaction Capitalization 
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V. Analysis 
 In this section I will discuss the implications of my results, their relations to 
existing literature for global alternative investment, and areas for further research.  
My geographic regional hypothesis for the region during the 2012-2014 period 
was that North America and Asia would have generated the greatest returns and 
transaction capitalization results. I also predicted that Europe would have deteriorating 
returns and volume, while South America would make modest advances in the two 
metrics. After examining the results, from the Burgiss Private IQ database, I found 
different conclusions. North America did lead in both internal rate of return and in 
transaction volume, and Asia was a strong second return in 11.8 IRR in 2014. Despite 
strong return results, Asia’s transaction volume was significantly less than Europe’s, and 
the European continent reported a 43.3% growth in transaction volume from 2012-2014, 
as it emerged from a recession-like environment. South America had particularly 
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surprising results, as the region reported a decreasing IRR (to -1.41% in 2014) and saw 
a 39.7% decrease in transaction volume. The next step was examining what factors were 
driving the observed geographic results.  
I set out to observe the impact of five unique market characteristics—total tax 
rate, inflation, government regulation on foreign direct investment, efficiency of legal 
framework, and levels of investor protection. I hypothesized that tax rate and investor 
protection would be the main two factors monitored, followed by government regulation 
on FDI and legal framework efficiency. I predicted that inflation would have the least 
impact on private equity metrics. After analyzing the regions by their WEF rankings for 
the five variables, I compiled the results into Table 5.1. 
The results, shown in Table 5.1, actually prove different conclusions from my 
hypothesis. Inflation actually had a strong inverse relationship with returns and 
transaction volume in every region except Europe. Total tax rate was also positively 
 
Asia Europe North America South America 
Investor Protection 44 52 22 50 
Regulations Effect on FDI 42 51 52 75 
Total Tax Rate 38.3% 53.5% 41.4% 60.1% 
Inflation 2.2% 1.6% 2.1% 6.9% 
Efficiency of legal 
framework  31 50 44 102 
Internal Rate of Return 
(IRR) 11.80% 2.74% 15.82% -1.41% 
Transaction Volume ($M) 19,440 53,250 167,314 3,231 
Transaction Volume 
growth 3-year growth rate 14.0% 43.3% 5.0% -39.7% 
Table 5.1: 2014 WEF Rankings vs. IRR and Transaction Capitalization 
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correlated with returns and transaction volume. The efficiency of legal frameworks in 
resolving private business disputes seemed important to the returns of a region, but did 
not factor into the transaction capitalization. Investor protection proved to the least 
significant variable since Asia, Europe, South America, and North America all had 
similar rankings yet had vastly different returns and volumes. The impact of government 
regulations on FDI did not appear to have major impact on metrics in this observation but 
still it was clear to higher rankings resulted in a worse overall market for private equity 
(i.e. South America). 
These conclusions on the variables build on the research done by Alexander Groh, 
who determined that, the strength of capital markets and interest rates, especially in 
Europe, were key determinants for alternative investment success (2011). My quantitative 
ranking analysis of the qualitative variables helps fill in white space left by Rafael La 
Porta, who stated that different legal frameworks, such as the differences between 
common and civil law have influence on the success and confidence of investors (2002). 
Finally, my research builds on the preliminary findings of reports by Bain & Company 
(2013) and Ernst & Young (2014), which offer a basic measurement of how the private 
equity industry is performing regionally, with offering explanation as to why these 
changes in investor preferences are occurring. 
 Though my research reached conclusions on five of the most relevant variables 
affecting private equity investing, there is opportunity for my research to be expanded in 
order to include even more variables that investors may monitor while doing due 
diligence on a regional investment. Other variables that can be additionally tested 
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regionally by using the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness report include 
the intensity of local competition, labor-employer relations, quality of education system, 
quality of overall infrastructure, and strength of auditing and reporting standards (2015). 
By doing further testing on these variables, one would be able to discover if more 
qualitative market factors would be beneficial when investors invest by observing how 
the rankings influenced return and transaction capitalization. Another metric I would like 
to be able to measure in all geographic regions is average leverage ratio of transactions. 
Unfortunately, any reporting of that statistic is highly imperfect due to selective bias of 
only select firms reporting results and general inconsistently in debt ratio reporting across 
the globe. In conclusion, my research has opened up the opportunity for more research to 
analyze the effects of additional qualitative market characteristics of countries across five 
continents.  
 
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
After researching the four regions using database statistics, professional reports, 
and academic research, I have reached a variety of conclusions on the regions and the 
variables used to research them. First of all, a key conclusion gained from my research is 
that all four regions are very different from each other. More specifically, each is at a 
different stage of the macro-economic cycle, with some mature countries rising out of 
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periods of recessed investment (USA, Europe), while other regions begin to deal with 
slowing growth (South America, China). The combination of exogenous and indigenous 
factors creates a unique mix that defines each region’s market for alternative investment. 
This conclusion is in line with many of the professional reports I referenced, including 
Bain & Company (2014), Ernst & Young (2014), and Prequin (2014). But the 
professional researchers at these firms fall short of describing what market factors 
distinguish each region. Beyond understand the uniqueness of each region it is clear that 
some of the new qualitative variables that I introduced to my research hold different 
weights in different regions.  
An observation I made as I looked into the qualitative market factors used in the 
study was that in some regions, depending on history and trading partnerships, certain 
factors had greater impact than they did in other areas of the world. For example, 
according to Table 6.1 below, government regulation on FDI was not a significant market 
factor for Asia, Europe, and North America. But South America, a region historically 
reliant on foreign investment due to neo-liberal policies implemented in the 20th century, 
relies heavily on foreign direct investment and trade partnerships with high growth areas 
such as Asia (Weyland, 2004). So when the World Economic Forum rankings reflected 
an increase in foreign business restrictiveness in South American countries, not only did 
transaction volume tumble, but private equity returns also struggled.  
In North America, we see the importance of investor protection laws, especially in 
the wake of the financial crisis. North America, and in particular the USA, had top ranks 
in investor protection. Strong investor and shareholder assurances, along with overall 
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macro-economic improvement are the main reasons that the US private equity market 
has been the strongest to emerge out of the global financial crisis (Saunders, 2010). By 
observing this association, we see that investor protection is the most impactful 
qualitative factor for North America. We can also use the table to determine which region 
would, and has struggled the most through the financial crisis. Through my study, 
European private equity did not react to four of the five variables I tested, included the 
two control macro-economic variables. If we get more specific, we see that only private 
equity in the United Kingdom has truly returned to significant growth, with countries 
such as France, Germany and Italy falling behind due to the lack of impact that macro-
economic catalysts (lower inflation rates) and qualitative factors (investor protection, 
regulation on FDI) have on pulling the alternative investment market out of the recession. 
All these conclusions were made possible due to my study—which set out test a summary 
hypothesis on the regional variation and on the use of qualitative variables in global 
private equity literature.  
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My final conclusion is that qualitative factors merit being included in global 
private equity. Of the five variables I tested, both control and variable, only one variable 
had an impact in all four regional private equity markets. Despite most professional 
reports and academic literature only focusing on macro-economic variables, such as 
interest rates, inflation rates, and tax rates, it was efficiency of legal framework in settling 
disputes, which had association with returns and transaction capitalization in every 
region. The combination of exogenous and indigenous factors is a threat to the internal 
validity of this conclusion, but regardless, its prevalence in my study makes it a necessary 
issue when discussing how the global private equity market is reflected in the literature.  
 
Implications 
 My findings open up white space for further research into the significance of 
qualitative market characteristics as it applies to the global alternative investment 
industry. For years, literature has almost solely focused on reflecting and predicting 
private equity success using macro-economic variables. In my research, I explored 
  
Asia Europe  North America South America 
Control  Total Tax Rate + - + + 
Hypothesis Inflation + - + + 
Variable 
Hypothesis  
Regulations Effect on 
FDI - - - + 
Efficiency of legal 
framework in settling 
disputes + + + + 
 Investor Protection - - + - 
Table 6.1: Control and variable hypotheses effect on return and transaction volume 
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whether other qualitative variables could also impact the success of private equity 
returns and volume. Professional reports, such as the work by Bain & Company and Ernst 
& Young, largely ignores qualitative context, and purely focuses their predictions on 
macro-economic trends in capital markets and economic growth.  
Other academics, such as Groh (2010), Wright (2009), and La Porta (2002) 
attempt to cover the impact of qualitative variables on alternative investing, but fail to 
account for global variation and don’t apply the variables to metrics of investing success.  
For example, La Porta (2002) covered the issue of investor protection and legal 
frameworks, but only focused on the differences between the civil and common law 
systems, not the actually legal process needed in private business lawsuits, which is what 
the variable “efficiency of legal framework” covers. Wright (2009) covers the topic of 
corporate governance in private equity decision-making, but fails to apply his theory to a 
global model, and falls short of testing his theory with real data. With my research, I hope 
to create white space where researchers such as Groh and Wright can test the associations 
of other qualitative factors listed in the WEF Global Competitiveness report (2014) vs. 
the success and activity of alternative investment firms.  
In the future, I plan to continue this research, and explore each specific variable in 
greater depth to its relationship with private equity. For example, I would like to see in 
what countries is the legal framework too complex or too simple to be effective, and what 
steps can be taken to make the legal framework more attractive to investors. Despite 
being a sparsely covered topic by literature, global alternative investment will only 
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continue to grow in the coming years, and I hope that my contribution will allow more 
academics to analyze market characteristics through a global data-driven approach. 
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